An Industrious European Council on Defence? Egmont Security Policy Brief No. 53, February 2014 by Fiott, Daniel
An Industrious European Council on Defence?  
Danie l  Fiot t  
 
The December 2013 Council meeting set 
in motion a number of important 
“roadmaps” for defence-industrial policy 
in Europe. Now the member states, the 
European Defence Agency and 
European Commission need to be aware 
of the potential roadblocks ahead. 
The December 2013 European Council 
meeting on defence has come and gone. As 
expected, there were no major revolutionary 
steps forward but more of a measured and 
systematic response to the future direction of 
European defence. The ability of the member 
states to agree to initiatives on air-to-air 
refueling, remotely piloted air systems (RPAS), 
satellite communications and cyber security is a 
step in the right direction. Some important 
steps were also taken in the sphere of defence-
industrial policy including calls for greater 
certification and standardisation for defence 
equipment, to step-up defence-related research 
cooperation, to support small and medium-
sized enterprises (SMEs) and to encourage 
security of supply.  
 
THE ROADMAP 
The European Council should be applauded 
for putting defence-industrial matters on the 
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agenda at the highest level in the European 
Union (EU), even if the conclusions agreed 
upon in December reflect issues that have 
long afflicted European defence markets. The 
member states not only reiterated the 
importance of the European Defence 
Technological and Industrial Base (EDTIB), 
but they also stressed the absolute need for 
EU law and its ability to shape Europe’s 
defence markets. The member states stressed 
‘the importance of ensuring the full and 
correct implementation and application’ of the 
“defence package” – two EU Directives 
agreed upon in 2009 on intra-EU defence 
equipment transfers and defence procurement. 
In this regard, the European Council 
welcomed the European Commission’s 2013 
Communication on defence. 
 
In response to the pressing needs of Europe’s 
defence industry, the member states agreed to 
four specific work areas in the Conclusions 
(see pp. 8-10): 
 
1) 1) Research – Dual-Use: the Council recognised 
the critical importance of technological 
expertise to the defence industry. The Council 
called on Member States to increase 
cooperation on Research and Development 
(R&D) programmes and investments. The 
No. 53 
February 2014 
 2 
 
EGMONT Royal Institute for International Relations 
 
Council also invited the Commission and 
European Defence Agency (EDA) to develop 
policies that would stimulate dual-use research, 
and it announced that a preparatory action on 
Common Security and Defence Policy 
(CSDP)-related research would be set up. 
 
2) 2) Certification and Standardisation: the Council 
acknowledged that the development of 
European standards and certifications for 
defence equipment could drive down costs, 
harmonise demand and enhance 
interoperability. On this basis, the Council is 
waiting for a joint EDA-Commission roadmap 
on defence standardisation, which should be 
ready by mid-2014. 
 
3) 3) SMEs: the Council recognised that SMEs 
can be a source of innovation and are vital to 
the EU’s competitiveness. The Council 
welcomed the Commission’s proposals on 
promoting greater defence- and security-
market access for SMEs. It also strongly 
encouraged more involvement by SMEs in 
future EU funding programmes. 
 
4) 4) Security of Supply: the Council emphasised 
that without security of supply in defence 
markets there could be no development of 
long-term planning, cooperation or the proper 
functioning of the internal market. The 
Council called on the EDA, European 
Commission, Member States and the High 
Representative to design a roadmap for a 
“comprehensive EU-wide Security of Supply 
regime”. 
 
THE POINT OF DEPARTURE 
The December Council could not have come 
at a more important time for the defence-
industrial sector in Europe. Indeed, the EDA 
recently estimated that the total level of 
defence expenditure across the 26 participating 
member states of the Agency decreased by 
€1.1 billion in the space of a single year from 
2011-2012. A total of €189.6 billion was spent 
on defence in 2012; the lowest amount since 
2006. R&D and Research and Technology 
(R&T), critical components of Europe’s 
defence-industrial evolution, also decreased 
sharply. From 2006 to 2012, R&D saw a 38% 
decrease in expenditure levels whereas R&T 
decreased by 27.4% (European Defence 
Agency, 2013). Most of the key factors that go 
into strengthening the EDTIB are on the 
wane. On top of these reductions are the 
extant problems of market fragmentation, 
capability duplication, procurement 
transparency, etc. 
 
The problem is deeper, however, when one 
looks at the state of Europe’s prized defence-
industrial champion: the European Aeronautic 
Defence and Space Company (EADS). 
Following the failed 2012 merger between 
BAE Systems and EADS, and the subsequent 
moves by EADS to re-balance the state-to-
private composition of their board, in May of 
this year the company will effectively off-load 
its defence-related business and take up a new 
name: Airbus Group. This is hardly the 
inspirational company name that was meant to 
symbolise private and state defence 
cooperation in Europe. Airbus Group will 
focus mainly on civilian aerospace now.  
 
The recent of history of EADS is a good 
barometer of all that is wrong with the defence 
industry in Europe. With low demand for 
military equipment, the high costs of R&D and 
technology development and increasing 
international competition EADS has no choice 
but to make rational decisions based on the 
current state and future forecasts of the 
defence sector in Europe. EADS is 
consolidating its defence portfolio by bringing 
together Airbus Defence and Space, Astrium 
and Airbus Military in order to cut costs in the 
face of a lack of demand: as one might say, 
while the “strategic direction is away, the 
markets will play”. Defence-industrial 
consolidation in Europe is currently rudderless 
and without political direction, so the markets 
are steadily ensuring that Europe’s defence 
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firms turn away from military business in 
favour of civilian contracts.  
 
Demand is the key to keeping companies such 
as EADS, with their wealth of virtual and 
human technological know-how and capital, in 
the defence sector. Yet quite how the EU 
member states foresee themselves giving 
direction to and consolidating their future 
military capability needs is still an unanswered 
question. True, the December Conclusions talk 
about the need for more coherent defence 
planning across the member states; both within 
the EU and NATO. However, the emphasis 
has been placed on the naming of collaborative 
armament projects such as RPAS. To be sure, 
such projects do much to boost trust between 
and political buy-in from the member states 
but they do not in themselves constitute the 
level and type of demand required by 
European primes, tiers and SMEs. A common 
European RPAS will not be enough to fill the 
order books.   
 
THE POTENTIAL ROADBLOCKS 
Even though the Council has made clear that 
there are to be no detours or pit stops, no 
journey would be complete without a few 
bumps in the road or even perhaps a 
roadblock or two. The four initiatives selected 
by the Council are open – and indeed prone – 
to political problems. Firstly, the research and 
dual-use track will see the EU structural funds 
– worth €325 billion over 2014-2020 – and 
COSME (the Commission’s Competitiveness 
of Enterprises and SMEs initiative), Horizon 
2020 and Framework Programme 7 
(particularly the Security Research Programme, 
which places great emphasis on dual-use 
technologies) mechanisms come into play. 
Such an initiative makes clear sense; if member 
states will not invest in defence R&D, then the 
EU will support SMEs to do so.  
 
The idea here is to integrate disparate industrial 
bases: the military and the commercial. Yet 
there is a danger in promoting dual-use 
research. In a world where military-specific 
R&D is healthily maintained, it makes sense to 
promote civil-military cooperation. Europe, 
however, is not home to healthy levels of R&D 
outlays. The danger is that the commercial world – 
where the rationale for product design and 
production is profit – and the military world – 
where the rationale for product design and 
production is security, strategy and warfare – 
may engage in an unhappy marriage with 
companies rather than the military defining 
technological needs and possibilities. Civilian 
products may sometimes be too costly to adapt 
for, and technologically ill-suited to, military 
purposes; that is unless militaries are willing to 
accept more of a commercial paradigm for 
their politico-military strategy making. 
 
The issue of SMEs will more than likely see the 
Commission explore how Horizon 2020 and 
the structural funds could be used for defence-
relevant companies. The Commission will most 
likely be successful in leveraging its financial 
and policy tools for the benefit of SMEs, but 
this is bound to cause a degree of friction 
between the different types of defence firms. 
Primes might be disgruntled as to why SMEs 
are getting special attention when it is them 
and top tier firms that are responsible for most 
of the R&T and R&D behind the production 
of defence capabilities for which most SMEs 
are incapable. Primes and top tiers have long 
held that EU funds channeled through them 
would be a good way of trickling down the 
benefits to SMEs, as orders come in and 
supply chains for finished products become 
engaged. However, the Commission is 
essentially hamstrung when it comes to primes 
and top tiers because of the restriction on EU 
funds being utilised for strictly military 
purposes.  
 
One solution could be to look for alternative 
sources of funding in the constellation of EU 
financing mechanisms. Any such alternative 
would have to be made available to primes, 
tiers and SMEs if it is to truly integrate the 
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defence industry. One such suggestion 
forwarded by this author (Fiott, 2013) is to make 
better use of the € 242 billion of available capital 
at the European Investment Bank’s (EIB) 
disposal. In line with Article 309 of the Lisbon 
Treaty, the EIB is free to fund military and 
civilian projects so long as they yield a return. 
EIB loans usually fund up 50% of a particular 
project by raising capital on international 
markets at reasonable rates, with projects 
focused on innovation and regional 
development – two areas that relate well to the 
defence sector – being favoured. Loans are 
approved by the Board of Directors – a body 
made up of member state representatives, a 
Commission representative and others – on the 
basis of a majority vote consisting of at least one 
third of the members able to vote and 
representing 50% of the subscribed capital 
invested by the EU member states (European 
Investment Bank, 2014). Using the EIB may not 
overcome institutional and political friction but 
its ‘loans could be a lifeline to the EDA […] 
which has seen its operational budget cut over 
successive years’ (Fiott, 2013b: p. 74). 
 
There are two reasons for the Commission’s 
emphasis on support for SMEs. Firstly, by 
stressing SMEs – which tend to produce dual-
use goods and services – the Commission can 
draw on the EU budget and other community 
tools, giving it an important buy-in to European 
defence-industrial policy making – the 
Commission is marginalised when it comes to 
supporting firms that produce purely military 
products (Fiott, 2013a). Secondly, as many 
primes are heavily interdependent with and 
sometimes owned by national governments – in 
the EU and elsewhere – this allows the 
Commission to avoid any uncomfortable 
political entanglements. The Council’s 
endorsement of the importance of SMEs has 
derived from two sets of interests: i) from those 
member states with primes and top tier firms 
that do not want the Commission to become 
involved with national dynamics; and ii) from 
those member states which have no primes or 
top tiers and that want support from the 
Commission for their national industries.  
 
SMEs are also linked to the issue of security of 
supply. While it might be true that to increase 
the supplier base available to member states 
may ease security concerns, it is also important 
to ask whether this supplier base is reliable and 
able to deliver quality defence equipment and 
componentry on time – relying solely on 
markets does not always ensure supply security 
(Fiott, 2013b: p. 76). An open market, 
transparent procurement framework and an 
increased supplier base through support to 
SMEs will no doubt form the backbone of the 
Commission’s future Green Paper on security 
of supply.  
 
Putting in place an EU-wide security of supply 
regime will therefore be challenging. The first 
hurdle will be to define “security of supply” as 
it relates to the defence sector. No state has 
ever really managed to obtain complete autarky 
in defence supplies, and the member states will 
certainly not attempt to rely on Europe’s own 
stocks of raw materials and productive factors 
to supply the defence sector: they realistically 
cannot given Europe’s resource constraints. 
The question will be whether the EU can put 
in place a security of supply regime that does 
not discriminate on market grounds.  
 
Certification and standardisation may also be a 
cause of friction. On the table in this regard 
are Chemical Biological Radiological and 
Nuclear (CBRN), RPAS and military 
airworthiness. Given the emphasis on dual-use 
items, surely the idea of standardisation would 
somehow have to be extended to the civilian 
sector. Given the importance of innovation in 
non-defence markets –think about how the 
operational distinctiveness of an Apple iphone 
and a Blackberry are their respective selling 
points –, is the EU sure that civilian operators 
will be comfortable with defence 
standardisation requirements? Some defence 
firms may also object. Further still, given the 
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emphasis on dual-use items and the greater 
participation of the civil sector, how will 
commercial operators be fed into equipment 
programmes that are marked as “top secret”. 
Again, the issue of security of supply – of 
information in this case – rears its head.    
 
FINAL DESTINATION? 
The fact that the European Council has called 
for a number of defence-industrial roadmaps 
may imply that the EU is still at the beginning of 
its journey towards a strengthened EDTIB. This 
may console some, but it may worry others. 
How can the EU only be at the beginning of its 
journey if its defence-industry is in such 
disarray? This is a justified question but one that 
is only partially reflective of reality. True, there is 
still a long way to go before the Europeans have 
anything like a sustainable and strong defence 
industry. Consolidation is still high on the 
agenda, as is putting in place a legal framework 
under EU law that works effectively. Yet the 
Europeans have been on the journey towards a 
strengthened defence-industry for decades: 
indeed, the European Defence Community and 
the Western European Union deliberated 
defence-industrial matters.  
 
The enduring problem has always been the 
tendency for member states to fall back on their 
own national positions. Just when one thinks a 
merger between Europe’s industrial 
powerhouses is on the cards for example, 
governments intervene to protect their 
interests and scupper the deal. The careful 
reader of the December conclusions will note 
that no remedy for such national positions is 
given, yet at least two of the four specific 
future work areas selected by the member 
states – standardisation and security of supply 
– strike at the very nerve centre of national 
sovereignty. The European Commission 
should be able to make important progress on 
SMEs and research over the next few years, 
but it remains to be seen whether or not the 
tension between national interests and 
European cooperation in areas of sensitive 
defence-industrial policy will lead to a cul-de-sac. 
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